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1.	Theoretical	Perspectives	on	the	German	Welfare	State	Germany	occupies	a	distinct	position	in	the	welfare	state	literature	because	it	is	widely	held	to	be	the	prototype	of	the	“conservative”	or	“Bismarckian”	welfare	regime.	Insurance-based	cash	benefits	financed	by	payroll	contributions	cover	the	risks	of	unemployment,	sickness,	and	old	age	for	workers	and	their	families,	whereas	social	services	are	relatively	underdeveloped	relative	to	other	affluent	democracies.	Social	provision	preserves	status	differences:	social	insurance	pays	benefits	closely	linked	to	previous	earnings,	with	better-off	groups	(civil	servants,	self-employed	professionals,	and	high	income-earners)	enjoying	more	generous	social	protection	than	the	average	wage-earner.	Nevertheless,	this	fragmented	system	of	social	provision	provides	universal	coverage	for	most	social	risks.		The	dominant	explanation	of	the	postwar	development	of	the	German	welfare	regime	is	that	it	rests	on	a	long	period	of	consensus	among	political	economic	and	societal	actors	about	the	basic	contours	of	social	provision	(see,	for	example,	Von	Winter	1997).	Christian	Democratic	dominance	in	legislative	politics	after	WWII	was	accompanied	both	by	the	necessity	of	forming	coalitions	with	the	Liberal	Party	(FDP)	or	the	Social	Democratic	Party	(SPD),	and	the	potential	for	veto	in	the	Bundesrat,	the	upper	chamber	of	parliament.	Social	policy	was	thus	forged	by	competitive	appeals	by	the	CDU/CSU	(Christian	Democratic	Union/Christian	Social	Union)	and	the	SPD	for	the	“pro-welfare	vote”,	and	by	several	compromises	between	the	CDU/CSU	and	SPD	at	the	expense	of	the	FDP.	These	conditions	ensured	that	social	policy	would	not	be	based	on	radical	redistribution	or	efforts	to	reshape	society	(as	in	Scandinavia).	Instead,	the	development	of	social	provision	after	WWII	was	marked	by	the	resurrection	of	central	principles	of	social	policy	developed	in	
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the	late	19th	century:	Bismarckian	social	insurance	for	wage	earners,	special	schemes	for	tenured	civil	servants,	and	an	important	role	for	civil	society	associations	in	the	administration	of	social	services	like	health	care	and	education	(Alber	1989;	Esping-Andersen	1990).		Recent	scholarship	moves	beyond	the	analysis	of	the	political	and	social	forces	that	have	shaped	the	German	welfare	regime	by	highlighting	the	complementarities	between	social	protection	schemes	and	economic	institutions.	Scholars	using	the	Varieties	of	Capitalism	(VoC)	framework	highlight	the	economic	functions	of	social	protection	in	coordinated	market	economies	(CMEs)	like	Germany	(Hall	and	Soskice	2001).	Here,	social	policies	are	not	just	the	currency	of	electoral	politics,	or	mechanisms	for	insuring	against	social	risks,	but	they	are	also	key	elements	of	an	integrated	set	of	socio-economic	institutions	in	which	employers	and	other	economic	actors	use	non-market	forms	of	coordination	to	pursue	their	economic	goals.	In	CMEs,	for	example,	generous	social	insurance	encourages	workers	to	invest	in	skills,	and	uniform	social	insurance	programs	prevent	employers	from	using	fringe	benefits	to	poach	qualified	workers	from	other	firms	(Estevez-Abe,	Iversen,	&	Soskice	2001).		The	institutional	development	of	the	German	welfare	regime	in	the	past	three	decades	is	puzzling	from	the	perspective	of	both	literatures.	Most	analyses	of	social	policy	development	since	about	1990	emphasize	the	liberalization	of	both	social	insurance	and	social	services	(Streeck	2007;	Trampusch	2009;	Palier	and	Thelen	2010;	Vail	2009).	Although	authors	disagree	about	the	extent	of	liberalization,	the	general	trend	is	clear:	recent	reforms	have	weakened	the	breadwinner	bias	of	social	policy	institutions;	weakened	corporatist	administration	of	core	programs	like	pensions	and	health	care;	introduced	market	mechanisms	into	core	programs;	and	increased	individuals’	and	the	state’s	share	of	financing	relative	to	contributions.	Given	the	emphasis	on	policy	stability	in	welfare	state	regime	scholarship	and	the	VoC	literature,	these	shifts	in	social	protection	are	surprising.	Do	fundamental	changes	in	the	post-war	political	consensus	or	the	workings	of	the	economic	institutions	crafted	via	the	post-war	settlement	explain	these	shifts,	or	are	other	causal	forces	at	work?			
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This	article	enters	these	debates	by	analyzing	policy	shifts	in	two	core	programs:	old-age	pensions	and	health	care.	Both	programs	are	prototypes	of	Bismarckian/conservative	program	design,	and	both	systems	have	experienced	tremendous	cost	pressures	because	of	demographic	change	and	rising	non-wage	labor	costs	(Häusermann	2010).	The	article	makes	three	central	claims.	First,	reforms	have	indeed	brought	about	significant	change,	but	the	basic	structures	and	redistributional	profile	of	the	German	welfare	state	nevertheless	remain	intact.	A	series	of	reforms	has	reduced	benefit	generosity,	and	have	aimed	to	change	the	governance	structures	of	both	pension	and	health	care	programs.	The	introduction	of	voluntary	private	pension	provision	(the	Riesterrente)	in	2001	and	the	Health	Care	Fund	(Gesundheitsfonds)	in	2009,	in	particular,	should	be	seen	as	reforms	that	reconfigure	the	incentives	both	to	the	insured	and	to	providers.		Although	political	compromises	watered	down	these	reforms,	they	introduce	changes	in	pension	and	health	care	financing	that	may	serve	as	institutional	templates	for	future	reforms.	At	the	same	time,	however,	key	conservative	principles	concerning	benefit	entitlement	and	financing	remain	largely	intact.	In	both	programs,	derived	rights	based	on	family	status	remain	strong.	Similarly,	occupational	fragmentation	continues	to	characterize	the	overall	structure	of	both	systems.	Weak	attempts	to	incorporate	all	income-earners	(wage-earners,	tenured	civil	servants,	and	self-employed	professionals)	into	one	universal	scheme	have	been	notable	failures.	Thus,	the	liberalization	of	health	care	and	pension	provision	has	not	seriously	challenged	the	occupational	fragmentation	and	breadwinner	orientation	of	social	policy.	In	the	field	of	pensions,	however,	three	decades	of	reform	have	significantly	weakened	the	insurance	principle.	Second,	two	decades	of	reform	will	produce	more	inequalities	than	in	the	old	systems.	There	is	more	differentiation	in	pension	levels,	and	growing	numbers	of	pensioners	will	receive	benefits	that	are	not	much	higher	than	the	poverty	line	(Bridgen	and	Meyer	2014;	Hinrichs	2012).		Take-up	rates	for	occupational	and	private	pensions	are	highly	stratified	by	income,	as	are	the	value	of	the	tax	expenditures	and	subsidies	used	to	encourage	coverage.	Similarly,	health	care	reforms	will	increase	individual	out-of-pocket	expenses,	which	will	hit	lower	income	
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groups	harder.	The	disparities	between	private	and	public	insurance	have	also	increased,	and	the	income-levels	and	conditions	of	medical	practice	for	various	specialties	and	health	sectors	are	becoming	more	diversified.		In	both	health	and	pensions,	reforms	mean	that	private	actors—banks	and	insurance	companies,	on	the	one	hand,	and	private,	for-profit	hospital	chains,	on	the	other—are	gaining	both	in	market	share	and	political	influence.	Thus,	while	basic	structures	and	programs	remain	intact,	the	social	safety	net	has	become	substantially	thinner.	Third,	the	article	argues	that	this	pattern	of	institutional	change	is	not	new,	but	is	typical	of	the	politics	of	incrementalism	that	has	characterized	the	German	welfare	state	since	its	inception.	I	emphasize	the	impact	of	German	political	institutions,	the	structure	of	electoral	competition,	and	the	legacies	of	conservative	social	policy	to	explain	this	negotiated,	incremental	pattern	of	policy	development.	Bicameralism	creates	strong	incentives	for	the	major	parties	to	compromise	on	social	policy	reforms,	even	when	they	express	different	social	policy	preferences	in	their	electoral	strategies.	Indeed,	the	pattern	of	reform	in	pensions	and	health	care	since	the	1990s	shows	that	consensus	social	policy-making	continues	to	flourish,	despite	claims	to	the	contrary	in	the	literature	(see,	for	example,	Trampusch	2009).	Majority	governments	whose	social	policy	legislation	requires	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat	are	usually	forced	to	compromise	with	the	opposition.	In	making	these	compromises,	the	two	major	‘Volk’	parties	are	torn	between	two	imperatives:	electoral	competition	based	on	the	generosity	of	social	benefits;	and	the	highly-politicized	rate	of	social	insurance	contributions,	a	legacy	of	the	systems’	dependence	on	social	insurance	contribution	financing.	The	parties’	partisan	visions	result	in	very	different	proposals	to	meet	these	goals;	but	in	the	end,	the	shared	conviction	that	a	balance	between	contribution	rates	and	social	spending	is	a	systemic	imperative	provides	the	basis	for	compromise.		These	arguments	challenge	the	existing	literature	in	several	ways.	First,	I	characterize	the	trajectory	of	change	not	in	terms	of	inevitable	responses	to	negative	policy	feedbacks	(Trampusch	2009;	Streeck	2007),	but	rather	as	a	process	of	on-going	recalibration	of	highly	institutionalized	programs	underpinned	by	conservative	welfare	principles.	Reforms	in	both	pensions	and	health	care	
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emphasize	cost-cutting	rather	than	paradigm	shift,	and	the	specific	mix	of	instruments	employed	in	this	recalibration	process	is	heavily	mediated	by	political	compromises.	Second,	the	analysis	emphasizes	political	decision-making	rather	than	industrial	relations	as	the	key	arena	shaping	reforms.	In	doing	so,	the	article	emphasizes	the	political	origins	of	social	policies	and	the	ongoing	political	contestation	that	shapes	social	policy	development.	To	be	sure,	party	stances	incorporate	the	views	of	societal	stakeholders,	but	there	is	little	evidence	that	changes	in	the	political	economy	have	been	the	primary	driver	of	welfare	state	reforms.	Nor	is	there	convincing	evidence	that	state	intervention	was	intended	to	arrest	institutional	exhaustion	caused	by	labor	market	practices.	Third,	the	analysis	casts	doubt	on	the	usefulness	of	the	Varieties	of	Capitalism	(VoC)	framework	for	explaining	social	policy	change.	Indeed,	there	is	little	evidence	that	institutional	isomorphism	and	complementarity	between	systems	of	social	protection	and	education/industrial	relations	shaped	reform	in	pensions	and	health	care.		 	
2.	German	Social	Politics	in	the	1990s	and	2000s	The	argument	developed	in	the	following	sections	brings	electoral	and	party	politics	back	into	the	analysis	of	welfare	state	change.	Ultimately,	it	is	political	parties	working	within	the	constraints	and	opportunities	provided	by	the	legislative	process	that	determine	whether	reform	will	occur	or	not,	and	on	what	terms.	To	be	sure,	political	actors	respond	to	the	appeals	and	preferences	of	economic	actors	in	formulating	their	electoral	strategies,	but	politics	is	not	simply	a	transmission	belt	for	the	preferences	of	core	actors	in	the	political	economy	(on	this	point,	see	Howell	2003),	but	rather,	a	highly	contingent	process.		As	discussed	below,	the	structure	of	political	institutions	in	Germany	creates	incentives	for	compromise	between	the	two	largest	parties,	the	SPD	and	CDU/CSU.	Both	parties	are	generally	pro-welfare	in	the	sense	that	they	both	favor	a	prominent	role	for	the	state	in	social	protection	and	generous	social	protection.	However,	the	two	parties	differ	on	crucial	aspects	concerning	the	design	of	welfare	institutions:	on	the	type	of	state	intervention	and	on	the	degree	of	redistribution.	In	policy-making,	these	differences	are	usually	reconciled,	and	conflicts	resolved,	because	the	legislative	process	rarely	provides	
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governments	with	majorities	in	both	legislative	chambers.	It	is	this	necessity	to	compromise,	or	what	Schmidt	(1987)	calls	the	“politics	of	the	middle	way”,	that	permeates	social	policy-making	in	Germany.	The	key	point	here	is	that	conflict	and	consensus	decision-making	go	hand	in	hand	in	countries	with	the	kinds	of	compromise-forcing	institutions	that	characterize	the	German	political	system.		Thus,	the	argument	advanced	here	is	that	there	is	much	more	continuity	in	social	policy	decision-making	in	Germany	than	the	dominant	views	in	the	literature	allow.	As	discussed	earlier,	much	of	the	literature	argues	that	the	social	policy	reforms	of	the	late	1990s	and	2000s	constitute	a	break	with	the	social	policy	consensus	of	the	post-war	period.	Our	position	is	that	this	consensus,	in	the	sense	of	overlapping	policy	preferences,	never	really	existed;	there	has	always	been	substantial	conflict	between	the	SPD	and	CDU/CSU	concerning	the	content	and	direction	of	social	policy,	and	that	the	specific	design	of	German	political	institutions	forced	the	two	major	parties	to	compromise.	This	social	policy-making	pattern	continues	to	the	present	day.	My	argument	draws	on	the	work	of	Schmidt	(1987),	Scharpf	(1988),	and	Katzenstein	(1987)	in	emphasizing	the	continued	importance	of	institutional	constraints	on	political	decision-making	in	Germany.	German	political	institutions	create	incentives	for	compromise,	incremental	decision-making,	and	even	policy	stalemate.	Schmidt’s	contention	that	Germany	is	a	de	facto	“grand	coalition	state”	is	most	apposite	here:	most	major	policy	reforms	require	a	de	facto	grand	coalition	because	concurrent	majorities	in	the	Bundestag	and	Bundesrat	are	fairly	uncommon.	Thus	even	when	a	center-left	or	center-right	government	coalition	rests	on	a	firm	majority	in	the	Bundestag,	the	fate	of	its	legislative	agenda	depends	on	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat.	This	institutional	fragmentation	makes	it	very	difficult	for	parties	in	government	to	pursue	legislative	agendas	that	depart	markedly	from	the	status	quo,	unless	the	opposition	is	on	board.	Given	that	most	social	policy	legislation	requires	Bundesrat	consent,	the	two	major	parties	must	settle	their	differences	before	legislative	agreement	is	possible.		 Since	the	1980s,	German	politics	has	been	marked	by	an	increase	in	political	competition	through	the	emergence	of	new	parties,	as	well	as	an	increase	in	the	
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seats	in	the	Bundesrat	as	a	result	of	the	German	unification.		Nevertheless,	the	patterns	of	consensus	democracy	have	not	changed	dramatically.		Figure	1	uses	comparative	party	manifesto	data	to	show	the	ideological	distance	between	the	two	major	parties	concerning	social	policy	spending	over	time.1	The	figure	does	not	support	the	contention	that	the	social	policy	positions	of	the	CDU/CSU	and	SPD	closely	mirrored	each	other	before	the	1990s.	Indeed,	CDU/CSU	and	SPD	positions	were	closest	to	each	other	in	the	1953,	1957,	and	1961	elections.	Starting	in	1965,	party	stances	start	to	diverge	substantially,	and	they	only	start	to	move	closer	in	the	1990s.	In	other	words,	the	contention	that	consensus	characterized	social	policy-making	from	the	1960s	to	the	1990s	is	not	supported	by	this	data	(cf.	Trampsuch	2009;	Von	Winter	1997).		Data	concerning	the	governmental	majorities	in	the	Bundesrat	show	that	parallel	majorities	in	both	chambers	of	parliament	have	never	been	the	norm.	Figure	2	shows	the	percentage	share	of	seats	in	the	Bundesrat	held	by	government	coalition	parties	between	1949	and	January	2014.	The	horizontal	black	line	indicates	the	50%	majority	threshold.	There	were	concurrent	government	party	majorities	in	the	Bundesrat	in	19	of	the	64	years	since	1949.	Thus,	even	when	a	center-left	or	center-right	government	coalition	rested	on	a	firm	majority	in	the	
Bundestag,	the	fate	of	the	government’s	legislative	agenda	usually	depended	on	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat.2	Furthermore,	even	in	periods	when	double	majorities	allowed	the	governmental	parties	to	impose	reform	(as	in	the	Kohl	era),	they	were	vulnerable	to	reversal	if	power	changed	hands	at	the	next	election,	as	we	discuss	at	more	length	below.	The	result	was	usually	lowest	common	denominator	policies	that	could	attract	support	from	both	large	‘catch-all’	parties.	
																																																								1	For	example,	in	1976,	16%	of	the	quasi-sentences	in	the	SPD	manifesto	mentioned	welfare	state	expansion	favorably,	compared	to	5.5%	in	the	CDU/CSU	manifesto.	2	Legislation	that	affects	the	activities	of	the	federal	states	(Länder)	requires	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat.	
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Figure	1:	SPD	and	CDU/CSU	favorable	mentions	of	welfare	expansion,	election	
manifestos	1949-2013	(in	per	cent	of	quasi-sentences)	
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Figure	2:	Government	majority	stake	in	the	German	Bundesrat	in	%	(last	
observation	per	year)	
	3.	Two	Cases	of	Social	Policy	making:	Pensions	and	Health	Care			 The	next	two	sections	make	two	claims	concerning	the	direction	of	reforms	in	both	pensions	and	health	care	since	1990.	First,	the	pattern	of	consensual	policy-making	that	characterized	the	post-war	period	to	1990	has	not	been	replaced	by	conflictual	decision-making.	Indeed,	the	“politics	of	the	middle	way”	continues	to	be	the	most	accurate	descriptor	of	social	policy-making	during	the	post-1990s	period,	with	party	differences	emphasized	in	elections,	and	middle-of-the-road	compromises	reached	during	policy	negotiations	in	the	legislative	process.	Second,	policy	change	in	both	pensions	and	health	care	display	very	strong	continuities	with	the	past.	To	be	sure,	both	systems	have	undergone	important	institutional	changes,	but	the	basic	structure	of	both	systems	remains	stable	in	terms	of	benefit	entitlement	(occupational	fragmentation),	the	promotion	of	marriage	and	child-bearing,	and	contribution	financing.	The	most	far-reaching	changes	have	concerned	
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administration	and	financing.	Organized	interests	no	longer	dominate	administration	as	they	did	in	the	past,	and	individuals	and	households	bear	a	significantly	larger	burden	of	the	costs	of	both	systems.	A	wholesale	paradigm	shift	has	not	taken	place	in	either	system,	but	the	reforms	adopted	since	1990	have	the	potential	to	be	transformative	in	the	long	run	because	they	may	be	used	to	slowly	change	the	logic	underlying	both	systems.		
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3.1	Pension	Reform		 The	statutory	pension	system	is	the	most	important	part	of	the	social	insurance	system	and	is	the	largest	social	program	in	terms	of	spending.	Retirement	provision	is	organized	according	to	Bismarckian	principles:	wage	earners	participate	in	the	statutory	pension	scheme	(Gesetzliche	Rentenversicherung,	GRV),	tenured	civil	servants	have	their	own,	tax-financed	schemes,	and	self-employed	professionals	have	their	own	schemes.	There	are	also	smaller	public	schemes	for	farmers	and	miners.	A	central	goal	of	the	system	is	to	provide	benefits	that	promote	status	maintenance:	retirement	income	should	mirror	the	pattern	of	earnings	while	in	employment.	Prior	to	2001,	the	standard	pension	for	an	average	earner	was	70%	of	average	net	wages.	Payroll	contributions	evenly	divided	between	employers	and	employees	(up	to	a	ceiling	equal	to	twice	average	earnings)	financed	benefits	until	recent	reforms,	with	the	government	providing	a	subsidy	(Bundeszuschuss)	to	help	cover	costs	and	to	finance	pension	accrual	for	which	no	contribution	was	paid	(for	example,	for	child-rearing).	The	basis	for	pension	entitlement	was	expanded	starting	in	the	1960s	to	include	periods	spent	in	education,	unemployment,	and	child-rearing	(Schulze	and	Jochem	2007;	Hinrichs	2012).		The	structure	of	the	system	means	that	public	benefits	dominate,	and	private	and	occupational	pensions	are	relatively	underdeveloped	(until	recent	reforms;	see	below).	In	2011,	the	statutory	pension	accounted	for	75%	of	all	pension	payments	to	those	65	or	older.	If	we	include	all	income,	for	example	from	capital	or	real	estate,	the	picture	is	slightly	different.	In	this	case	the	statutory	pension	accounts	for	64%	of	all	gross	income	for	those	65	and	older.	Pensioners	in	the	former	West	Germany	receive	more	income	from	other	sources	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales	2013,	96).	Figure	3	shows	the	sources	of	gross	income	for	persons	aged	65	and	older.			
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Figure	3:		Income	sources	of	those	65	and	older,	2011	
	Men's	pensions	are	substantially	higher	than	women's.	Current	pensioners	entered	employment	starting	in	the	1940s,	when	traditional	gender	roles	were	more	common.	The	average	man's	net	pension	was	€1,695	in	2011,	while	the	average	woman's	net	pension	was	€1,027	(figures	are	for	monthly	pension	amounts).	The	numbers	are	quite	different	if	we	consider	marital	status.	Married	women	receive,	on	average,	much	lower	net	pensions,	at	€686.	Married	men	receive	an	average	net	pension	of	€1,746	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales	2013,	101).	These	substantial	differences	in	men’s	and	women’s	pensions	are	not	surprising	given	the	strong	breadwinner	orientation	of	the	labor	market	and	welfare	state	until	recently.	Tax	policy,	wage	policy	and	the	underdevelopment	of	social	services	created	very	strong	incentives	for	a	traditional	gender	division	of	labor	(Daly	2000;	Anderson	&	Meyer	2006;	Meyer	2013),	and	women’s	labor	market	participation	remained	low	(in	European	perspective)	until	the	1980s.		
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	 After	a	period	of	expansion,	policy	development	since	the	1980s	has	been	driven	by	two	factors.	First,	policymakers	have	grappled	with	the	consequences	of	rising	unemployment	and	the	rising	share	of	pensioners	relative	to	workers,	both	of	which	put	pressure	on	contribution	rates.	German	unification	exacerbated	this	problem.	Second,	policymakers	have	made	several	attempts	to	adapt	pension	entitlement	to	reward	not	just	labor	market	participation,	but	also	child-rearing.	Cost-cutting	reforms	have,	however,	dominated	(Schulze	&	Jochem	2007;	Hinrichs	2012).		 The	social	insurance-based	structure	of	the	statutory	pension	has	been	the	target	of	reform	since	the	1960s.	If	social	insurance	contributions	finance	defined	benefits,	the	locus	of	adjustment	is	always	on	the	contribution	side,	rather	than	the	benefit	side.	Starting	in	the	late	1960s,	policy-makers	began	raising	contributions	to	finance	anticipated	increases	in	the	number	of	pensioners	relative	to	workers	(Hockerts	2012).	The	unemployment	crises	of	the	1970s,	1980s,	and	1990s	led	to	more	contribution	hikes	(figure	4),	as	did	German	unification,	because	the	social	insurance	system	was	used	to	absorb	much	of	the	cost	of	unification	(Manow	and	Seils	2000).	Rising	unemployment	meant	that	the	revenue	base	(pension-qualifying	payroll)	did	not	increase	in	line	with	pension	costs,	and	this	pushed	up	non-wage	labor	costs	as	well	as	state	expenditures	(figure	4).	Policy-makers	have	responded	to	growing	pension	costs	by	increasing	the	federal	subsidy	(Bundeszuschuss)	to	the	statutory	pension	system.	As	figure	5,	shows,	the	federal	subsidy	remained	fairly	stable	between	1979	and	the	mid-1990s,	financing	18-22%	of	expenditure.	Starting	in	1998,	however,	reforms	have	expanded	the	overall	size	of	the	federal	subsidy	through	the	creation	of	special	subsidies	financed	by	ear-marked	revenue	sources,	such	as	a	proportion	of	VAT	and	a	new	eco-tax	(Ökosteuer)	revenues.	Thus,	even	if	political	actors	agreed	on	the	basic	features	of	the	system,	high	contribution	rates	and	growing	state	pension	costs	created	strong	incentives	for	cost-cutting	and	measures	to	strengthen	financing.			 In	addition	to	these	financial	pressures,	the	pension	system	came	under	pressure	for	its	one-sided	focus	on	employment	as	the	basis	for	entitlement.	In	particular,	rulings	by	the	Constitutional	Court	since	the	mid-1980s	required	several	
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governments	to	introduce	pension	credits	for	child	rearing	(Anderson	and	Meyer	2006).	As	discussed	below,	the	reforms	of	the	2000s	and	2010s	strengthen	this	trend.		 The	content	of	pension	reform	since	1989	emphasizes	cost-cutting	in	order	to	adjust	the	system	to	demographic	trends.	Reforms	rely	on	the	familiar	tools	of	pension	retrenchment:	benefit	cuts,	raising	the	retirement	age,	and	expanding	non-state	provision.	In	addition,	the	generosity	of	survivors	pensions	has	been	reduced	and	pension	entitlement	for	child-rearing	has	been	improved.	The	1989	pension	reform	passed	under	the	CDU/CSU-FDP	government	led	by	Helmut	Kohl	introduced	modest	benefit	cuts,	limits	on	early	retirement,	and	a	higher	retirement	age	for	women,	the	unemployed	and	disabled.	At	the	same	time,	pension	rights	for	child-rearing	were	increased	from	one	to	three	years,	and	the	size	of	the	federal	subsidy	was	increased	(Schulze	and	Jochem	2007;	Schludi	2005).		An	important	aspect	of	the	1989	reform	is	that	it	was	adopted	with	the	support	of	the	opposition	SPD	and	by	a	unanimous	Bundesrat	where	the	government	parties	had	a	majority.	The	legislation	reflects	the	nature	of	this	compromise:	the	CDU/CSU	and	FDP	gained	support	for	important	cost-cutting	measures	while	the	SPD	won	concessions	in	terms	of	the	retirement	age	and	the	size	of	the	federal	subsidy.	Most	analysts	interpret	this	pattern	of	support	as	evidence	for	the	consensus-oriented	nature	of	pension	policy-making	prior	to	the	1990s	(see,	for	example,	Trampusch	2009;	Nullmeier	and	Rüb	2003).	The	analysis	presented	here,	in	contrast,	offers	an	equally	plausible	explanation	for	cross-party	cooperation:	the	SPD	faced	strong,	institutionally-induced	incentives	to	cooperate	with	the	governing	coalition	to	prevent	pension	cuts	from	dominating	the	election	scheduled	for	1990.	For	the	SPD,	cooperation	created	an	opportunity	to	influence	aspects	of	the	legislation	important	to	party	interests,	particularly	increasing	the	federal	subsidy	and	limiting	cuts	on	early	retirement	(Schludi	2005).		The	CDU/CSU	also	stood	to	gain	from	SPD	cooperation	because	voters	would	not	be	able	to	trace	pension	cuts	directly	back	to	the	party;	instead,	the	CDU/CSU	would	share	the	blame	for	cuts	with	the	SPD	(on	blame	avoidance,	see	Pierson	1994).				
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The	costs	of	German	unification	and	poor	employment	performance	were	the	backdrop	to	the	Kohl	government’s	other	important	pension	reform,	the	Pension	Reform	Act	1999	(adopted	in	1997).	The	reform	included	modest	cuts	in	disability	pensions,	a	demographic	factor	linking	benefits	to	changes	in	life	expectancy,	another	increase	in	the	federal	subsidy,	and	improvement	in	the	value	of	pension	credits	for	child-rearing.	Unlike	the	1989	pension	compromise,	however,	the	CDU/CSU-FDP	government	now	faced	a	Bundesrat	dominated	by	the	SPD.	To	head	off	a	Bundesrat	veto,	the	government	divided	the	legislation	into	two	parts,	one	that	did	not	need	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat,	and	one	that	did.	The	non-financial	provisions	of	the	reform	were	thus	included	in	the	Pension	Reform	Act	1999,	which	the	Bundestag	adopted	in	October	1997.	The	Bundesrat	used	its	right	to	object	to	the	legislation,	but	the	Bundestag	was	able	to	overrule	this	by	a	simple	majority.	The	financial	heart	of	the	reform,	the	increase	in	the	federal	subsidy,	was	then	introduced	as	separate	legislation	requiring	the	approval	of	both	chambers.	After	a	complicated	negotiation	process	in	which	the	SPD	in	the	Bundesrat	agreed	to	support	the	legislation	if	it	included	an	increase	in	the	federal	subsidy	(financed	by	an	increase	in	VAT)	and	improved	pension	coverage	for	the	marginally	employed	(which	ultimately	failed),	both	chambers	adopted	the	legislation.	(see	Schulze	and	Jochem	2007	and	Schludi	2005	for	detailed	analyses).	The	change	of	government	in	1998	now	gave	the	SPD-Green	government	the	legislative	initiative	under	very	favorable	conditions:	the	governing	parties	enjoyed	majorities	in	both	the	Bundestag	and	Bundesrat.	During	the	election	campaign,	Red-Green	promised	to	reverse	some	of	the	pension	cuts	legislated	by	the	previous	government,	advancing	their	own,	alternative	pension	agenda.	The	Red-Green	government	quickly	adopted	legislation	in	December	1998	that	reversed	the	demographic	factor	and	some	disability	pension	cuts	that	were	part	of	the	1997	reform.	The	legislation,	the	Pension	Correction	Act,	sailed	through	the	SPD-dominated	Bundesrat.	The	reform	also	included	measures	to	stabilize	the	pension	contribution	rate	and	increase	the	federal	subsidy.	The	Red-Green	government’s	more	ambitious	pension	reform	plans	were	announced	in	1999:	modest	long-term	pension	benefit	cuts	and	expanded	private	
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provision.	The	steady	increase	in	the	pension	contribution	(breaching	the	informal	limit	of	20%)	was	a	highly-visible	threat	to	employment	that	could	not	be	ignored,	and	the	reform	was	intended	to	correct	this	problem.	Consequently,	the	SPD	drew	on	Social	Minister	Riester’s	proposal	for	a	compulsory	private	pension,	for	which	contributions	would	be	gradually	increased	to	4%	of	wages.	As	a	result	of	the	political	bargaining	over	the	original	Riester	proposal—which	was	not	acceptable	to	either	coalition	partners,	the	opposition,	and	even	large	parts	of	the	SPD—a	voluntary,	tax-subsidized	private	pension	program	was	introduced,	at	the	same	time	that	substantial	savings	were	achieved	by	freezing	pension	indexation	for	two	years	(see	Anderson	and	Meyer	2003	and	Schulze	and	Jochem	2007	for	details	of	the	reform	process).	A	change	in	the	Bundesrat	majority	made	the	Red-Green	pension	reform	project	much	more	difficult.	In	October	1999	SPD-led	states	in	the	Bundesrat	controlled	26	seats,	CDU/CSU-led	states	32	seats,	while	states	governed	by	grand	coalitions	controlled	11	votes.	With	35	votes	needed	for	a	majority,	Red-Green	would	have	to	compromise	on	the	parts	of	the	reform	requiring	Bundesrat	consent.	In	preparing	the	legislation,	Red-Green	invited	the	opposition	to	cooperate,	and	when	this	failed,	the	government	acquiesced	to	several	CDU/CSU	demands	in	order	to	secure	the	Bundesrat’s	consent.	Concessions	included	linking	subsidies	for	private	insurance	to	the	number	of	children	in	a	household,	increasing	the	size	of	subsidies	for	private	provision,	and	locating	employment	related	to	the	new	private	pensions	in	the	states	of	Berlin	and	Brandenburg	(Anderson	and	Meyer	2003;	Zolnhöfer	2008).				 Subsequent	reforms	build	on	this	mix	of	cost-cutting,	incentives	for	private	provision	and	expansion	of	coverage	for	child-rearing.	The	Red-Green	government	adopted	an	incremental	reform	in	2004	(The	Rürup	Reform)	that	includes	several	modest	benefit	cuts	(less	favorable	indexation,	introduction	of	a	sustainability	factor	to	limit	spending	growth	and	a	one-year	pension	freeze).	To	soften	these	cuts,	the	reform	also	introduced	a	maximum	benefit	cut	(benefits	may	not	fall	below	46%	of	previous	average	wages	for	a	standard	pensioner).	The	legislation	did	not	require	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat;	however,	the	Bundesrat	used	its	right	to	object	to	the	
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legislation.		The	Bundestag	overrode	this	objection	with	the	required	simple	majority.		Red-Green	was	also	able	to	attract	opposition	support	for	another	2004	reform,	the	Law	on	Income	in	Old	Age,	that	introduced	modest	adjustments	to	the	new	private	pension	products	and	implemented	a	technical	change	in	the	taxation	of	public	pensions.	A	decision	by	the	Constitutional	Court	required	changes	to	pension	taxation	(so	that	the	tenured	civil	servant	pensions	were	taxed	under	the	same	rules	as	public	pensions).	The	legislation	required	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat	which	was	dominated	by	the	opposition.	The	federal	state	Bavaria	tried	to	mobilize	opposition	to	the	legislation	in	the	Bundesrat,	but	there	were	enough	votes	in	favor	by	CDU	governments	to	secure	passage,	because	of	Red-Green	concessions	concerning	the	taxation	of	insurance	products	(Handelsblatt,	11	June	2004).		The	final	important	reform	of	the	2000s	was	the	introduction	of	a	higher	retirement	age	in	legislation	passed	in	2007,	with	effect	in	2012.	The	law	raises	the	statutory	retirement	age	from	65	to	67	between	2012	and	2029.	The	legislation	did	not	require	Bundesrat	consent,	and	it	passed	easily.			 			 	
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Figure	4:	Statutory	Pension	Contribution	Rate,	1970-2014	(%	of	qualifying	
wages)	
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Figure	5:	Size	of	Federal	Subsidies	to	Statutory	Pension,	as	per	cent	of	total	
pension	costs,	1960-2012	
		 		 How	do	these	reforms	change	the	basic	structure	and	goals	of	the	pension	system?	As	figure	5	shows,	the	state’s	share	of	pension	financing	has	increased	substantially.	This	is	the	result	of	measures	introduced	to	relieve	upward	pressure	on	payroll	contributions	and	to	finance	periods	of	insurance	that	are	not	financed	by	payroll	contributions.	A	second	substantial	change	is	the	significant	reduction	in	future	benefits.	Between	1990	and	2014,	the	pension	for	a	worker	with	45	years	of	employment	at	average	wages	has	decreased	from	55.1%	to	48%	of	average	earnings.	By	2028,	the	replacement	rate	is	forecast	to	be	44.4%.	Indeed,	recent	pension	analyses	from	the	government	openly	admit	that	the	public	pension	will	not	be	high	enough	to	maintain	a	pensioner’s	previous	standard	of	living	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales,	2013,	12).		An	explicit	goal	of	reforms	
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since	2001	has	been	the	voluntary	expansion	of	private	and	occupational	pensions	to	compensate	for	cuts	in	the	statutory	pension.	Since	the	2001	pension	reform,	occupational	pensions	have	increased	significantly.	In	2001	there	were	14.6	million	active	occupational	pension	contracts,	and	this	had	increased	to	19.6	million	in	2011	(an	increase	of	34%)	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales.	2013,	135).	The	2001	reform	also	included	provisions	allowing	workers	to	use	request	tax-favored	salary	sacrifice	(Entgeltumwandlung);	salary	sacrifice	is	the	most	important	driver	of	the	increase	in	occupational	pension	provision	in	the	last	10	years	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales.	2013,	137).	In	addition,	individuals	may	buy	tax-preferred	individual	contracts	(the	Riester	pension).	At	the	end	of	June	2012,	there	were	15.6	million	individual	Riester	contracts.	In	2012,	about	70%	of	those	covered	by	the	statutory	system	had	additional	pension	coverage.		According	to	simulations	from	the	Ministry	of	Social	Affairs	and	Employment,	an	average	earner	with	an	uninterrupted	employment	biography	will	continue	to	receive	a	net	pension	from	all	sources	(statutory	pension,	Riester	pension,	private	pension)	equal	to	at	least	70%	of	net	average	earnings	in	2012.	As	table	1	shows,	the	net	pension	income	from	all	sources	remains	at	least	70%	provided	that	the	individual	saves	the	maximum	amounts	in	the	new	Riester	pension	plans.		
Table	1:	The	development	of	combined	public/private	pension	replacement	
rates	for	an	average	earner	
year	of	
retirement	
gross	
replacement	
rate	
consisting	of	 net	combined	
replacement	
rate	
GRV	 Riester	pension	 private	pension		 %	 %	 %	 %	 %	2012	 47.4	 45.5	 1.7	 0.2	 70.7	2015	 47.4	 44.6	 2.4	 0.4	 70.1	2020	 48.5	 44.0	 3.7	 0.9	 70.9	2025	 48.8	 42.3	 4.9	 1.6	 71.8	2030	 49.3	 40.6	 6.2	 2.5	 72.8	Source:	Bundesministerium	fuer	Arbeit	und	Soziales,	2013,	176.		Many,	if	not	most,	wage	earners	do	not	have	a	complete,	full	time	employment	biography	with	average	earnings.	Wage	earners	with	low	incomes	save	too	little	for	retirement:	42%	of	those	earning	less	than	€1500	gross	per	month	do	
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not	have	an	occupational	pension	or	a	Riester	contract.	Two	thirds	of	those	without	supplementary	coverage	are	women	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales		2013,	9).	Moreover,	workers	with	average	or	above	average	earnings	who	experience	spells	of	unemployment	will	receive	a	combined	net	pension	that	is	5-6	percentage	points	lower	than	the	pension	received	by	someone	with	an	on	interrupted	employment	biography	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales.	2013,	177).		Despite	cuts	in	overall	pension	provision,	recent	reforms	have	also	attempted	to	address	some	of	the	lingering	inequalities	in	the	system.	For	example,	the	new	Rürup-Rente	is	a	tax-preferred	basic	pension	introduced	at	the	beginning	of	2005	as	part	of	the	Law	on	Income	in	Old	Age.	This	pension	is	modeled	on	the	statutory	pension	and	is	aimed	at	the	self-employed.	At	the	end	of	June	2012	there	were	1.6	million	Rürup	pension	contracts	(Bundesministerium	für	Arbeit	und	Soziales	2013,	152).	 The	grand	coalition	government	in	power	since	2013	has	responded	to	concerns	about	growing	inequalities	at	the	lower	end	of	the	wage	scale	by	introducing	a	pension	for	low	income	earners	with	long	employment	histories	(Lebensleistungsrente):	those	who	have	paid	at	least	45	years	into	the	statutory	pension	system	can	now	retire	at	age	63.	This	is	a	partial	reversal	of	recent	reforms	that	raise	the	retirement	age.	Additionally,	the	government’s	2014	pension	package	improves	pension	entitlement	for	parents	of	children	born	before	1992.	The	tenor	of	these	reforms	is	to	increase	the	value	of	child	years	for	parents	and	years	for	other	kinds	of	care	and	to	improve	the	pension	rights	of	those	on	a	low	income.	Neither	reform	required	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat,	and	they	both	passed	easily.	It	is	also	worth	noting	what	reforms	have	not	changed	in	the	German	pension	system.	The	SPD	has	made	weak	attempts	to	reduce	occupational	fragmentation	by	including	tenured	civil	servants	in	the	statutory	pension,	but	these	efforts	came	to	nothing.	This	means	that	occupational	fragmentation	remains	a	core	feature	of	the	German	system.	More	interesting	for	the	present	purposes	is	the	role	of	conservative	principles	in	the	ongoing	reform	of	the	statutory	pension	and	in	the	design	of	the	new	Riester	pension.	Reforms	since	1986	have	expanded	pension	
	 22	
rights	for	child	rearing.	This	is	largely	consistent	with	the	conservative	norms	underpinning	the	German	welfare	states,	because	pension	accrual	for	child	rearing	can	discourage	female	labor	market	participation	and	encourage	women	to	continue	care	work	in	the	home.	Moreover,	tax	preferences	and	government	subsidies	for	Riester	pension	contracts	are	higher	for	those	with	a	spouse	or	children	than	they	are	for	unmarried	persons	and/or	those	without	children.		Table	2	summarizes	the	reforms	discussed	in	the	previous	section.	The	1990s	and	2000s	have	been	marked	by	reforms	that	introduce	substantial	long-term	reductions	in	benefit	levels,	encourage	private	provision	to	compensate	for	these	cuts,	and	stabilize	contribution	rates.	The	reforms	since	2010,	in	contrast,	offer	modest	corrections	to	earlier	cuts	by	increasing	the	value	of	child	years	for	some	cohorts	and	re-introducing	early	retirement	for	those	with	long	employment	histories.			 Grand	coalition	bargaining	in	the	context	of	federal	decision-making	institutions	has	had	a	decisive	influence	on	this	incremental	pattern	of	reform.	The	SPD	and	CDU/CSU	cooperated	on	the	passage	of	six	of	the	ten	reforms	analyzed	here	(table	2),	either	as	formal	coalition	partners	(2007,	2014),	informal	partners	(1989),	or	after	negotiations	in	the	Bundesrat	(1997,	2001,	2004).	 	
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3.2	Health	Care	Reform		 The	German	health	care	system	is	also	organized	according	to	Bismarckian	principles:	workers	in	dependent	employment	are	required	to	participate	in	the	national	Statutory	Health	Insurance	(SHI)	system.	Workers	with	an	income	above	the	statutory	insurance	ceiling	(about	two	times	average	wages)	may	stay	in	the	statutory	system	or	take	out	private	health	insurance.	Tenured	civil	servants	have	their	own	schemes,	supplemented	by	private	insurance.	Statutory	sickness	funds	(Krankenkassen)	cover	about	88%	of	the	German	population	and	finance	about	57%	of	health	care	costs	(figures	for	2006;	Müller	and	Böhm	2009,	p.	38).		Like	pensions,	the	institutional	structure	of	the	health	care	system	has	remained	fairly	stable	since	the	end	of	the	19th	century	(Stone	1980;	Alber	1992;	Immergut	2009).	Statutory	benefits	are	financed	by	payroll	contributions	divided	evenly	between	workers	and	employers	(up	to	the	contribution	ceiling).	Dependent	spouses	and	children	are	included	in	the	insurance	coverage	of	the	wage	earner	in	dependent	employment.	Until	recently,	corporatist	health	care	actors	were	responsible	for	central	features	of	health	care	decision-making	and	implementations.	The	sickness	funds	set	their	own	contribution	rates,	and	the	powerful	Associations	of	SHI	Physicians	(Kassenärztliche	
Vereinigungen)	negotiated	payments	with	the	sickness	funds,	as	did	hospitals.		Like	pensions,	the	health	care	system	has	been	the	object	of	reform	efforts	since	the	1980s,	largely	because	of	rising	costs	and	the	resulting	upward	pressure	on	contribution	rates.	Between	1992	and	2012,	total	health	care	spending	increased	from	about	9.5	per	cent	of	GDP	to	11.3	per	cent	of	GDP	(with	notable	decreases	between	2003	and	2007	and	2009	and	2011;	see	figure	6).		The	structure	of	health	care	financing	created	problems	similar	to	those	in	pensions:	social	insurance	contributions	levied	on	payroll	meant	that	contribution	increases	were	implicated	in	debates	about	rising	non-wage	labor	costs.	It	was	precisely	this	feature	of	the	health	care	system—which	reached	dramatic	proportions	after	German	unification—that	provided	the	impetus	for	reform.	The	rising	cost	of	health	care	could	not	be	externalized	onto	consumers	or	taxpayers,	but	rather,	would	have	to	be	borne	by	social	insurance	contributions.	At	the	same	time,	health	care	advocates	
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argued	that	in	an	aging	society,	a	proportion	of	the	wage	bill	is	not	an	adequate	guide	for	allocating	resources	into	the	health	care	area.		
Figure	6:	Total	expenditure	on	health	care	in	%	GDP	
		 Health	insurance	reforms	have	not	attempted	to	restructure	the	basic	features	of	the	health	care	system;	instead,	they	have	tried	to	promote	efficiency	and	cost	savings	by	modifying	the	incentives	and	constraints	faced	by	actors	in	the	health	care	system.	Governance	structures,	especially	the	complicated	administrative	arrangements	that	determine	the	fees	paid	by	the	sickness	funds	to	doctors,	hospitals	and	other	health	care	providers	have	been	a	particular	target	of	reform.	Nearly	all	of	the	reforms	adopted	since	1988	introduce	some	form	of	cost-cutting:	the	introduction	or	increase	of	co-payments	for	medication,	medical	supplies,	office	visits	and	hospital	stays.	In	addition,	services	and	pharmaceuticals—notably	dental	fixtures—have	been	removed	from	the	catalogue	of	treatments	
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covered	by	social	insurance.	This	has	resulted	in	a	significant	shift	in	the	burden	of	paying	for	health	care,	from	the	sickness	funds	to	households	(see	below,	figures	7	&	8).	Reforms	have	also	aimed	to	reduce	costs	and	increase	efficiency	by	stimulating	competition.	For	example,	wage	earners	have	had	free	choice	of	sickness	fund	since	1997.	Similarly,	case-based	payments	for	hospitals	(Diagnosis-Related	Groups,	DRGs),	and	the	weakening	of	the	institutional	separation	between	ambulatory	and	stationary	medical	care	aim	to	improve	health	care	delivery	by	changing	the	incentives	to	providers.	However,	despite	the	emphasis	on	cost-cutting	of	the	CDU/CSU-FDP	government	(1983-1998),	DRG	payments	have	increased	the	incentives	to	hospitals	to	provide	services,	and	hence	to	an	increase	in	hospital	costs.		Furthermore,	favorable	negotiations	with	medical	organizations	under	both	the	Red-Green	(1998-2005)	and	Grand	Coalition	(2005-2009;	2013-present)	governments	have	also	increased	health	care	costs.		The	1988	Health	Reform	Law	was	one	of	the	first	to	address	the	growth	of	health	care	expenditure	and	its	impact	on	non-wage	labor	costs.	Most	health	care	reform	legislation	was	subject	to	Bundesrat	consent	at	the	time,	but	the	CDU/CSU-FDP	government	enjoyed	concurrent	majorities	in	the	Bundestag	and	Bundesrat,	which	would	facilitate	passage.	Nevertheless,	the	SPD	and	CDU/CSU	tried	to	negotiate	a	compromise	reform	in	the	pre-legislative	phase,	but	this	came	to	nothing	because	of	strong	disagreements	in	reform	priorities.	The	CDU/CSU	(and	its	coalition	partner,	the	FDP)	favored	marginal	changes	that	maintained	governance	structures	and	spread	the	costs	of	reform	across	all	stakeholders	(providers,	patients,	contribution-payers).	The	SPD	advocated	reforms	of	health	care	governance	and	emphasized	individual	health	rather	than	provider	payments	(Perschke-Hartmann	1994,	95).	The	1988	legislation	introduced	very	modest	changes:	more	and	higher	co-payments	for	prescription	drugs	and	a	reduction	of	the	number	of	prescription	drugs	eligible	for	reimbursement.	The	opposition	in	the	Bundestag	(SPD,	Greens,	and	PDS)	voted	against	the	legislation,	but	it	passed	easily	in	both	chambers	because	of	concurrent	government	majorities.		The	1992	Health	Structure	Act	(Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz),	legislated	by	an	informal	grand	coalition	(the	opposition	SPD	participated	in	formulating	the	
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legislation),	changed	the	parameters	governing	decision-making	about	health	care	by	introducing	top-down	steering	instruments	such	as	limits	on	the	numbers	of	physicians	allowed	to	participated	in	statutory	health	care	provision	and	budget	caps.	The	reform	also	allowed	free	choice	of	sickness	insurance	fund,	thereby	weakening	one	of	the	sickness	funds’	sources	of	organization	strength.	With	the	SPD	on	board	at	an	early	stage,	passage	in	the	SPD	dominated	Bundesrat	was	assured.	The	1996	Law	to	Decrease	Contributions	built	on	this	orientation	by	proposing	additional	modest	reductions	in	reimbursements	for	dental	care,	higher	co-payments	for	prescription	drugs,	and	other	incremental	reductions.	The	legislation	was	based	on	intensive	negotiations	with	the	SPD	as	part	of	the	bipartisan	Alliance	for	Jobs;	controlling	health	care	costs	was	seen	as	a	way	to	reduce	non-wage	labor	costs	and	boost	employment.	The	SPD	was	divided	about	whether	to	accept	deteriorations,	but	opted	to	support	the	legislation	in	order	to	reduce	the	cost	of	labor	(Jochem	2004).		The	CDU/CSU-FDP	coalition	continued	its	reform	efforts	with	the	1997	Statutory	Health	Care	Reorganization	Act,	which	introduced	modest	competition	by	allowing	sickness	funds	to	contract	with	individual	physicians,	thereby	weakening	the	power	of	the	Association	of	SHI	Doctors	(cf.	Bandelow	2009).		The	legislation	also	continued	the	trend	established	in	previous	reforms	by	increasing	co-payments	and	limiting	reimbursement	for	dental	procedures.	The	SPD-dominated	Bundesrat	argued	unsuccessfully	that	the	proposal	required	the	consent	of	the	Bundesrat,	so	it	had	to	settle	for	objecting	to	the	bill.	The	Bundestag	overruled	this	objection	easily	with	a	simple	majority.				 The	change	of	government	in	1998	did	little	to	change	the	incremental	orientation	of	health	care	reform,	at	least	in	terms	of	outcomes.	The	reduction	of	non-wage	labor	costs	were	a	political	priority,	so	the	newly-elected	Red-Green	government	quickly	introduced	a	modest	reform	(The	Act	to	Strengthen	Solidarity	in	SHI)	aimed	at	both	cost	control	and	softening	some	of	the	cuts	affecting	patients	included	in	the	1997	reform.	The	legislation	required	the	consent	of	the	SPD-dominated	Bundesrat	and	passed	easily.	
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	 After	the	CDU/CSU	regained	control	of	the	Bundesrat	in	1999,	however,	Red-Green’s	health	reform	plans	stalled.	The	Green	Party	controlled	the	Health	Ministry	and	quickly	announced	its	intention	to	maintain	quality	and	reduce	costs	by	reforming	key	elements	of	health	care	governance,	including	the	monopoly	of	SHI	doctors	to	contract	with	SHI	on	volume	and	reimbursement.	The	original	version	of	the	bill	included	a	budget	cap	(“global	budget”)	for	SHI	spending,	but	this	element	failed	because	of	CDU/FDP	opposition	in	the	Bundesrat.	The	Bundesrat	rejected	the	1999	Statutory	Health	Insurance	Act	(GKV-Reform	2000),	and	Red-Green	was	then	forced	to	rework	the	proposal	so	that	Bundesrat	consent	was	not	necessary.	The	watered	down	legislation	made	modest	changes	in	payments	to	health	care	providers,	chiefly	through	DRG	payments	(see	Gerlinger	2002	for	details).	This	debacle	led	to	the	replacement	of	the	Green	Party	Health	Minister	(Fischer)	with	one	from	the	SPD	(Schmidt).		The	SPD-led	ministry	presided	over	the	adoption	of	several	minor	reforms	in	2001	that	strengthened	state	regulation	of	health	care	costs.	However,	the	2002	Contribution	Stabilization	Act	threatened	to	turn	into	a	battle	of	the	chambers	when	the	CDU/CSU	dominated	Bundesrat	claimed	its	consent	was	necessary	while	the	government	and	Bundestag	claimed	it	was	not.	The	Act	contained	additional	cost-cutting	measures	to	stabilize	the	contribution	rate,	including	a	freeze	on	dental	reimbursement	levels	and	slight	increases	in	pharmaceutical	rebates.	The	SPD	President	of	the	Bundesrat	finally	ruled	that	the	legislation	did	not	need	Bundesrat	consent,	and	it	passed	by	a	simple	majority	in	the	Bundestag.	2002	legislation	requiring	hospitals	to	adopt	DRGs	also	faced	a	rocky	legislative	road.	Bundesrat	consent	was	required,	and	the	first	version	of	the	legislation	failed	to	muster	a	Bundesrat	majority.	Negotiations	in	the	Conciliation	Committee	(Vermittlungsausschuss)	yielded	several	compromises	that	facilitated	Bundesrat	approval.	After	several	years	of	conflict	with	the	Bundesrat,	the	SPD-controlled	Health	Ministry	reached	out	to	the	opposition	CDU/CSU	for	a	more	substantial	reform,	negotiating	the	2004	SHI	Modernization	Act	(GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz).	The	reform	introduces	risk-structure	compensation,	strengthens	reference	pricing	and	
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increases	co-payments	and	user	fees.	The	reform	also	strengthens	state	steering	of	health	care	by	modifying		governance	structures	and	weakening	the	role	of	the	Associations	of	SHI-approved	Physicians.	The	law	allows	the	establishment	of	medical	care	units	(Medizinische	Versorgungszentren),	further	weakening	the	role	of	the	Physicians’	Association.	The	reform	also	centralized	decision-making	by	establishing	the	Federal	Joint	Committee	(Gemeinsamer	Bundesausschuss)	that	replaces	similar	actors	and	which	decides	on	the	benefit	catalog	and	approval	for	new	treatments	(Bandelow	2009).			
Figure	7:	Share	of	total	health	care	financing,	by	type	of	payer.	As	%	of	total	
health	care	spending,	1992-2012	
		The	election	of	the	SPD-CDU/CSU	grand	coalition	in	2005	added	momentum	to	reform	efforts.	One	of	the	most	important	reform	since	1990	was	adopted	in	2007:	the	Act	on	Strengthening	Competition	(Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz).	This	
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law	attempts	a	synthesis	of	tendencies	present	in	previous	reforms	that	is	a	potential	catalyst	for	future	structural	change.	Like	the	Riester	Reform,	it	was	adopted	after	a	period	of	intense	electoral	competition	between	the	SPD	and	the	CDU	(coming	to	a	head	in	the	2005	electoral	campaign)	regarding	two	very	different	visions	for	the	future	health	system.		The	SPD	proposed	a	‘Bürgerversicherung,’	(citizens’	insurance)	which	would	end	the	stratification	of	the	insured	by	occupational	groups	and	the	division	between	public	and	private	health	insurance	by	taxing	all	forms	of	income	under	a	consolidated	national	health	insurance	plan.		The	CDU	proposal,	in	contrast,	was	a	premium-based	insurance	system,	(the	“Kopfpauschale’)	which	would	have	ended	the	family	breadwinner	model	of	health	insurance,	under	which	spouses	and	dependents	are	co-insured.		This	would	have	preserved	the	private	insurance	market,	and	dramatically	reduced	redistribution	in	the	health	system,	but	health	insurance	subsidies	were	planned	to	soften	these	effects.		Both	plans	would	have	substantially	increased	tax	revenues	for	health	insurance	by	decoupling	contributions	from	wages.		As	the	2005	election	did	not	produce	a	decisive	winner,	the	resulting	Grand	Coalition	government	prepared	a	compromise	proposal	in	2007,	which	nevertheless	introduced	some	far-reaching	changes	into	the	system.	The	cornerstone	of	the	reform	is	a	common	Health	Fund	(Gesundheitsfonds)	and	mandatory	insurance	coverage.	Both	private	and	statutory	insurance	carriers	are	required	to	offer	a	basic	insurance	package	at	a	fixed	price	to	all	applicants	regardless	of	health	status.	The	law	also	requires	compulsory	coverage,	which	did	not	exist	before.		The	Health	Fund	is	an	important	departure	from	previous	practice	because	all	contributions	to	the	statutory	sickness	funds	are	now	paid	into	a	common	fund.	A	uniform	contribution	rate	also	applies	across	sickness	funds,	and	state	financing	has	increased.	The	fund	distributes	monies	to	the	sickness	funds	based	on	a	risk-adjusted	capitation	payment	for	each	person	insured	by	a	particular	fund.	Funds	that	can	provide	health	insurance	benefits	for	less	than	this	capitation	rate	may	reimburse	their	members;	or,	in	case	of	deficit,	they	may	levy	an	income-related	additional	contribution.	These	administrative	changes	are	intended	to	promote	cost	savings	and	efficiency	because	sickness	funds	now	face	stronger	incentives	to	
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compete	for	members—including	chronically-ill	or	other	high-risk	patients—and	to	provide	cost-effective	services.	To	this	end,	the	scope	for	individualized	coverage	and	preferred	provider	agreements	has	been	increased,	while	the	role	of	the	associations	of	sickness	funds	and	insurance	doctors	has	decreased.	At	the	same	time,	the	reform	also	introduced	capitation	fees	for	medical	providers,	which	will	decrease	the	relative	incomes	of	ambulatory	specialists	by	comparison	to	GPs,	and	has	further	reduced	the	role	of	the	corporatist	associations	previously	charged	with	negotiation	physician	payments	on	a	collective	basis	(Jochem	2008;	Immergut	2009).	The	legislation	passed	easily	given	concurrent	majorities	in	the	Bundestag	and	Bundesrat.	Reforms	adopted	since	2007	mark	a	return	to	incrementalism	in	pursuit	of	cost	containment.	The	CDU/CSU-FDP	coalition	that	governed	from	2009-2013	legislated	minor	reforms:	2011	legislation	introduces	a	cap	on	employer	contributions	to	the	statutory	health	insurance	system,	balanced	by	compensation	for	low-income	households.	Other	legislation	modifies	pharmaceutical	pricing	(2011).	These	reforms	reflect	the	continued	concern	for	controlling	non-wage	labor	costs,	as	well	as	the	FDP’s	preference	for	limiting	further	intrusions	on	physician	autonomy.	The	opposition	SPD	opposed	both	bills,	but	they	did	not	require	Bundesrat	consent,	and	they	were	adopted	easily.	Table	3	(Annex)	summarizes	the	political	aspects	of	the	reforms	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	as	well	as	their	contents.	Reforms	introduce	incremental	cuts	in	the	generosity	of	health	provision	and	limits	on	payments	to	providers.	At	the	same	time,	reform	efforts	may	be	seen	as	incoherent,	as	they	have	focused	on	both	increasing	market	competition	and	state	regulation	of	the	health	system.	Elements	of	competition	and	benefit	decreases	have	been	introduced	that	have	significantly	‘privatized’	health	risks,	especially	for	the	compulsorily	insured,	and	that	aim	to	increase	competitive	pressures	on	providers.	In	particular,	the	increasing	reliance	on	budgetary	caps	for	doctors	and	dentists,	stricter	regulation	of	pharmaceutical	pricing	and	caps	on	prescriptions,	and	new	forms	of	payment	including	partial	capitation	represent	a	move	towards	more	direct	state	regulation	in	the	health	sector	(Gerlinger	and	Schmucker	2009).	At	the	same	time,	market	mechanisms	have	
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been	introduced	or	strengthened,	for	example,	by	changes	in	the	relationship	between	health	care	providers	and	sickness	funds.		 This	pattern	of	reform	is	decidedly	incremental,	and	it	preserves	the	basic	structure	of	the	health	care	system.	Occupational	fragmentation	remains,	and	health	care	providers,	especially	the	Association	of	SHI	Physicians,	remain	important	actors	in	health	care	governance,	even	if	the	state	has	asserted	its	control	over	central	aspects	of	health	care	policy.	As	in	pensions,	grand	coalition	bargaining	in	the	context	of	federal	decision-making	institutions	has	had	a	decisive	influence	on	this	incremental	pattern	of	reform.	The	SPD	and	CDU/CSU	cooperated	on	the	passage	of	eight	of	the	18	reforms	analyzed	here	(table	3),	either	as	formal	coalition	partners	(2007),	informal	legislative	partners	(1992,	2003),	or	during	negotiations	in	the	Bundesrat	(1996,	2001,	2002).	The	seven	reforms	that	did	not	require	Bundesrat	consent	were	also	shaped	by	informal	grand	coalition	bargaining,	because	they	often	began	their	legislative	life	as	proposals	requiring	Bundesrat	consent,	but	after	rejection	in	the	Upper	Chamber,	they	were	reformulated	(and	weakened)	in	order	to	escape	Bundesrat	consent	(1999)	or	they	were	designed	at	the	outset	to	circumvent	the	Bundesrat.	The	2005	Federalism	Reform	modestly	reduced	the	proportion	of	legislation	requiring	Bundesrat	consent,	facilitating	the	passage	of	reforms	after	2010	(Zolnhöfer	2008).	
	
3.3	Increasing	inequalities	in	health	care	and	pensions		 The	last	two	decades	of	health	care	reform	have	resulted	in	a	rising	financial	burden	for	private	households.	One	of	the	most	important	tools	for	cost	containment	has	been	to	increase	copayments	for	pharmaceuticals,	medical	supplies,	dental	care	and	hospital	stays.	These	measures	have	increased	private	households’	and	nonprofit	organizations’	share	of	the	overall	costs	of	the	system.	As	the	figure	below	shows,	in	1992	private	households	paid	about	11%	of	total	healthcare	spending.	Between	1995	in	2005,	this	share	increased	to	about	14%,	and	it	has	been	stable	since	then.	The	main	cause	for	this	increase	was	the	removal	of	several	kinds	of	medical	coverage	from	the	national	list	of	covered	services	for	the	sickness	funds	(GKV-Leistungskatalog)(Müller	and	Boehm	2009,	p.	16).	
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Figure	8:	Share	of	health	care	costs	paid	by	private	households	and	non-profit	
organization,	in	%	of	total	spending	
	Source:	Gesundheitsberichterstattung	des	Bundes		 Pension	reforms	will	also	lead	to	growing	inequalities.		As	noted	above,	only	individuals	who	voluntarily	buy	individual	pension	contracts	or	who	are	covered	by	an	occupational	pension	plan	will	have	roughly	the	same	income	replacement	that	the	pre-2001	system	offered.	Given	the	increase	in	atypical	employment	and	the	tendency	of	low-income	and	atypical	workers	to	not	buy	individual	pension	coverage,	the	retirement	income	gap	between	those	in	full-time,	standard	employment	and	those	in	atypical	employment	is	likely	to	increase.	In	addition,	Bridgen	and	Meyer	(2014)	find	that	even	standard	workers	in	key	sectors	will	experience	significant	drops	in	income	in	retirement	(see	also	Hinrichs	2012).		 As	we	have	seen,	however,	the	politics	of	the	middle	way	has	already	resulted	in	some	corrections	to	these	trends,	and	may	well	do	so	in	future.	
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4.	Conclusion	This	article	argues	that	the	development	of	German	social	policy	since	the	late	1980s	shows	remarkable	continuity,	both	in	terms	of	the	pattern	of	policy-making	and	in	terms	of	program	structure.	The	trajectory	of	policy	change	in	the	pension	and	health	care	system	has	been	a	process	of	ongoing	recalibration	of	highly	institutionalized	policies.	Analysis	of	the	political	forces	shaping	these	reforms	suggests	that	the	“grand	coalition	state”	is	still	an	apt	characterization	of	social	policymaking	in	Germany.	Political	institutions	continue	to	create	very	strong	incentives	for	the	two	major	parties	to	compromise	on	social	policy.	This,	no	doubt,	explains	much	of	the	incremental	nature	of	reforms	since	1990.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	parties	agree	on	the	basic	principles	of	social	policy	development.	Indeed,	both	the	SPD	and	the	CDU/CSU	have	made	their	social	policy	differences	very	clear	in	election	campaigns	and	parliamentary	bargaining.	Thus	the	paradox	of	social	policy	development	since	1990	is	that	electoral	grandstanding	has	increased	because	the	parties	compete	for	votes	in	a	much	more	competitive	environment.	Nevertheless,	formal	and	informal	grand	coalition	bargaining	continues	to	rule	the	day.		 In	contrast	to	many	contributions	to	the	literature	on	the	transformation	of	the	German	welfare	state,	this	article	emphasizes	the	continuing	influence	of	conservative	principles	on	the	direction	of	change.	Liberalization	is	certainly	a	central	aspect	of	reform	processes,	but	this	liberalization	has	not	strongly	challenged	several	core	conservative	principles:	occupational	fragmentation	and	family-based	benefit	entitlement.	In	other	words,	pension	and	health	benefits	have	been	reduced,	but	this	has	occurred	within	the	basic	structure	of	conservative	welfare	statism,	and	has	been	counter-balanced	by	compensatory	mechanisms.	There	is	one	exception	to	this	trend:	reforms	significantly	weaken	the	effectiveness	of	the	insurance	principle	in	pensions.		Incremental	cost-cutting	measures,	especially	in	the	pension	system,	will	result	in	significantly	lower	average	pensions	for	future	retirees.	Likewise,	the	strengthening	of	market	principles	in	the	health	care	system	will	lead	to	higher	costs	for	low-income	groups.		
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The	analysis	presented	here	also	casts	doubt	on	industrial	relations	as	a	key	driver	of	welfare	state	reform.	To	be	sure,	the	structure	of	health	care	and	pension	financing	(via	payroll	contributions)	was	a	central	target	of	reform,	because	of	pressure	on	non-wage	labor	costs.	Unions,	and,	especially,	employers	lobbied	for	cost	control	in	both	programs,	but	this	has	been	a	constant	feature	of	German	welfare	politics	in	the	post-war	period.	Moreover,	non-wage	labor	costs	remain	high	in	European	perspective:	in	2014	the	combined	(employer	and	employee)	social	insurance	contribution	rate	was	38.9%	of	qualifying	wages	(this	includes	pensions,	health	care,	care	insurance	and	unemployment	insurance).	Employees	pay	a	slightly	larger	share	of	obligatory	contributions	(0.9	percentage	points	in	health	care)	than	employers,	but	this	hardly	amounts	to	an	overwhelming	victory	for	employers.	Indeed,	union	and	employer	bargaining	in	corporatist	channels	was	not	an	important	influence	on	reform	processes.	Unions	and	employers	certainly	lobbied	political	actors	in	pursuit	of	their	preferred	policies,	but	neither	got	much	of	what	it	wanted.	Moreover,	governments	have	shown	their	willingness	to	press	forward	with	reforms	opposed	by	either	unions,	employers,	or	both.	This	is	particularly	true	in	pensions:	unions	vigorously	opposed	the	2001	reform,	while	employers	argued	it	did	not	go	far	enough.	The	situation	was	reversed	in	2013	when	unions	welcomed,	and	employers	opposed,	the	re-introduction	of	early	retirement	for	workers	with	45	years	of	service.		Esping-Andersen’s	discussion	of	the	conservative	welfare	regime	was	always	ambivalent;	he	never	seemed	to	be	able	to	decide	whether	the	proper	label	was	“conservative”,	“corporatist”	or	“Christian	Democratic.”	Our	analysis	highlights	instead	the	continuing	relevance	of	the	social	market	welfare	state	based	on	implicit	grand	coalition	agreements	between	the	SPD	and	the	CDU/CSU.	Despite,	first,	Conservative	and	then	later	Christian	Democratic	dominance,	the	German	welfare	state	never	represented	a	coherent	conservative	vision	of	society.	Instead,	institutional	features	introduced	through	historical	contingencies	gained	a	modicum	of	coherence	as	societal	stakeholders	and	corporatist	bodies	adapted	and	used	these	institutions	in	a	process	of	historical	bricolage.		Over	time,	institutional	adaption	has	been	accomplished	through	a	series	of	bi-partisan	compromises	that	have	bridged	
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fundamental	disagreements	about	the	role	of	the	state	and	the	degree	of	preferred	redistribution.	Some	of	these	agreements—such	as	the	change	from	gross	to	net	wage	indexation	in	1987	in	pensions	or	the	introduction	of	risk-compensation	to	health	insurers—have	provided	the	basis	for	significant	change.	Whether	recent	efforts	to	bring	about	change	through	reforms	of	governance	structures	will	prove	to	be	ultimately	successful	will	depend	upon	whether	current	and	future	political	compromises	intensify	or	truncate	these	measures.			 	 	
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